

1 Projecting the second outbreaks for global COVID-19 pandemic

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11 12 13 Abstract

14 COVID-19 is now in an epidemic phase, with a second outbreak likely to appear
15 at any time. The intensity and timing of a second outbreak is a common concern
16 worldwide. In this study, we made scenario projections of the potential second outbreak
17 of COVID-19 using a statistical-epidemiology model, which considers both the impact
18 of seasonal changes in meteorological elements and human social behaviors such as
19 protests and city unblocking. Recent street protests in the United States and other
20 countries are identified as a hidden trigger and amplifier of the second outbreak. The
21 scale and intensity of subsequent COVID-19 outbreaks in the U.S. cities where the
22 epidemic is under initial control are projected to be much greater than those of the first
23 outbreak. For countries without reported protests, lifting the COVID-19 related
24 restrictions prematurely would accelerate the spread of the disease and place mounting
25 pressure on the local medical system that is already overloaded. We anticipate these
26 projections will support public health planning and policymaking by governments and
27 international organizations.

28 **1 Introduction**

29 Recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has spread rapidly and poses a dire threat to global
30 public health, which claimed over 0.49 million lives, along with 9.8 million confirmed cases
31 as of June 28th¹. Beyond the spread itself, the outbreak may have far-reaching consequences,
32 negatively affecting the economic development worldwide and posing a series of long-standing
33 social problems^{2,3}. There is an urgent need for a global prediction system that can provide
34 scientific guidelines for the World Health Organization and international decision-makers to
35 implement effective containment measures capable of curbing the spread of COVID-19⁴.
36 Researchers worldwide have developed various models with mathematical and statistical
37 methods, including stochastic simulations, lognormal distribution⁵, machine learning, and
38 artificial intelligence⁶. Among them, the susceptible-infectious-removed infectious disease
39 model (SIR) is the most widely used⁷⁻⁹. However, this simple model is built under a series of
40 idealized assumptions, which may limit the accuracy and reliability of the prediction. In order
41 to obtain the prediction results with higher credibility, more complex models with fewer
42 assumptions should be developed so as to simulate the actual situations in a more realistic
43 manner¹⁰.

44 Although it is difficult to establish an accurate epidemiological model describing the
45 spread of a pandemic, the reported global pandemic data contain particular solutions to the
46 mathematical equations incorporated in epidemiological models^{3,6}. It is theoretically possible
47 to remedy the defects of prior epidemiological models by introducing the latest pandemic data
48 and hence improve the pandemic prediction^{2,4,6}. Based on this idea, we have developed a
49 Global Prediction System of the COVID-19 Pandemic (GPCP)¹¹. The system develops a
50 modified version of the SIR model and determines the parameters through historical data
51 fitting^{12,13}, which allows it to make targeted predictions for various countries and obtain better
52 prediction results. The first version of GPCP (CPCP-1) can capture the major features of the
53 daily number of confirmed new cases and provides reliable predictions. However, the
54 prediction of GPCP-1 is only valid for one month¹¹.

55 In this study, the second version of the Global Prediction System for COVID-19 Pandemic
56 (GPCP-2) is developed based on a modified SEIR model¹⁴. The system considers both the
57 seasonal changes of meteorological elements and human social behaviors including protests
58 and city unblocking. The paper is arranged as follows: the details of the datasets and the
59 methodology used are given in section 2. In section 3, projections of 12 cities in the United
60 States are presented. The projections of 15 countries with reported protests and 15 countries
61 without reported protests are shown in section 4 and section 5, respectively. Discussion and
62 conclusion are presented in section 6.

63 **2 Method**

64 2.1 The modified SEIR model

65 The second version of Global Prediction System for COVID-19 Pandemic (GPCP) is built
66 based on a modified SEIR model¹⁵. The traditional SEIR model^{10,14} defines seven states of the
67 disease: susceptible cases (S), insusceptible cases (P), potentially infected cases (E, infected
68 cases in a latent period), infectious cases (I, infected cases that have not been quarantined),
69 quarantined cases (Q, confirmed and quarantined cases), recovered cases (R), and cases of
70 mortality (D). The SEIR model is able to emulate the time curve of an outbreak. The model is
71 consisted of the following equations:

$$72 \quad \frac{dS(t)}{dt} = -\beta(t)I(t)S(t)/N - \alpha S(t), \quad (1)$$

$$73 \quad \frac{dP(t)}{dt} = \alpha S(t), \quad (2)$$

$$74 \quad \frac{dE(t)}{dt} = \beta(t)I(t)S(t)/N - \gamma(t)E(t), \quad (3)$$

$$75 \quad \frac{dI(t)}{dt} = \gamma(t)E(t) - \delta(t)I(t), \quad (4)$$

$$76 \quad \frac{dQ(t)}{dt} = \delta(t)I(t) - \lambda(t)Q(t) - \kappa(t)Q(t) \quad (5)$$

$$77 \quad \frac{dR(t)}{dt} = \lambda(t)Q(t) \quad (6)$$

$$78 \quad \frac{dD(t)}{dt} = \kappa(t)Q(t) \quad (7)$$

79 The sum of the six categories is equal to the total population (N) at any time.

$$80 \quad S + P + E + I + Q + R + D = N$$


81 We modified the model by introducing the timing of community reopening collected from

82 news reports. If the timing collected from news reports is not explicit enough as an input to our
83 model, the timing will be indicated by the daily new cases on the day of reopening (dQ_c). As
84 the number of newly confirmed cases on a given day falls lower than dQ_c , local authority begins
85 to lift or loose the lockdowns.

86 In addition, the temporal variation of transmission rate due to changes in local temperature
87 as well as human behaviors are considered. Generally, the transmission rate ($\beta(t)$) can be
88 expressed by the following equations:

$$89 \quad \beta(t) = \begin{cases} \beta_0 & t < t_{int} \\ \beta_1 & t_{int} \leq t < t_{lift} \\ \beta_2 + E \times F(t) & t \geq t_{lift} \end{cases}$$

90 where β_0 represents the transmission rate in the non-intervention period at the early stage of
91 the pandemic ($t < t_{int}$); β_1 represents the transmission rate during the intervention period
92 ($t_{int} \leq t < t_{lift}$); β_2 represents the transmission rate after the restriction is lifted. β_0 and β_1
93 are fitted against the actual reported data, while β_2 is the assumed value in possible future
94 scenarios. We assume a 14-day delay in the effect of the intervention on the infection rate. $F(t)$
95 is the PDF function obtained by Huang et al.¹⁶, who found that 60.0% of confirmed COVID-
96 19 cases occurred in places where the air temperature ranged from 5°C to 15°C. Using the
97 NCEP reanalysis data, we calculated the global distribution of probability distribution function
98 (PDF) values on each day of the year and included its influence on the infection rate. Figure 1
99 shows the PDF values for the four seasons in a year. High PDF values correspond to the ambient
100 temperature that is conducive for the virus to spread. For the northern hemisphere, the optimal
101 band generally moves northward in summer (June, July, and August) and moves southward in
102 winter (December, January, and February), while for southern hemisphere the optimal band
103 moves southward in summer (December, January, and February) and moves northward in
104 winter (June, July, and August).



105

106 **Figure 1: The optimal temperature zone for the spread COVID-19.** Regions with warm
107 shadings indicate more conducive temperature for the spread of the virus and vice versa.

108 Since the seasonality of transmission is still disputed and future trajectory of the outbreaks
109 may be influenced by the intensity of intervention measures, four future scenarios are designed
110 to project the epidemic after easing COVID-19 related restrictions:

111 - **Scenario 1:** The restrictions are completely lifted after t_{int} ($\beta_2 = \beta_0$). The seasonal forcing
112 on the transmission rate is considered ($E = 1$).

113 - **Scenario 2:** The restrictions are partially lifted after t_{int} ($\beta_2 = (\beta_0 + \beta_1)/2$). The seasonal
114 forcing on the transmission rate is considered ($E = 1$).

115 - **Scenario 3:** The restrictions are completely lifted after t_{int} ($\beta_2 = \beta_0$). The seasonal forcing
116 on the transmission rate is not considered ($E = 0$).

117 - **Scenario 4:** The restrictions are partially lifted after t_{int} ($\beta_2 = (\beta_0 + \beta_1)/2$). The seasonal
118 forcing on the transmission rate is not considered ($E = 0$).

119 2.2 Parameter fitting and numerical solutions


120 In order to enhance the stability of the traditional least square method (Gauss-Newton
121 algorithm), we use an improved damped least square method called Levenberg-Marquardt

122 algorithm¹⁷. This method inserts a damping coefficient into the Gauss-Newton method when
123 calculating the Hessian matrix. The benefit of introducing this damping coefficient is that it
124 can converge very quickly in the steepest direction in many cases even when the initial solution
125 is very far from ideal values, which makes the parameter determination more robust¹⁸. In
126 addition, for all damping coefficient greater than 0, the coefficient matrix is positive definite
127 which makes the Hessian matrix in the descending direction. The input variables to obtain fitted
128 parameters ($\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \lambda$, and κ) are the time series of confirmed ($Q(t) - D(t) - R(t)$), death
129 ($D(t)$), and recovered ($R(t)$) cases provided by from Johns Hopkins University Center for
130 Systems Science and Engineering¹. The equations are solved using the classic 4th order Runge-
131 Kutta method.

132 **3 Projections of the US cities**

133 Unfortunately, the recent protests against police violence in cities across the United States
134 have gone ahead despite the current rising COVID-19 pandemic and potential subsequent
135 outbreaks, possibly with higher intensity. Large public gatherings, shouting, and marching
136 shoulder to shoulder may have already sown the seeds of the second outbreaks in regions under
137 initial control^{19,20} and made it even more difficult to contain the epidemic in regions where the
138 curve is still increasing. The use of tear gas and pepper spray against the protesters may also
139 have produced violent coughing and runny noses, forcing protesters to remove their masks and
140 making the crowds even more susceptible to the virus. A certain number of patients with the
141 latent disease may have participated in the protests and spread the disease to healthy protesters,
142 police officers, and national guards who are not yet immune to the virus²¹. If the close contacts
143 of the infectious are not fully tracked, they may spread the virus to other groups of people,
144 increasing the risk of a larger size of outbreaks. Here, we simulated the impact of large-scale
145 protests on the potential second outbreaks in several cities of the United States²² (Figure 2 and
146 Table 1). The model generally predicted a second wave of COVID-19 in the second half of
147 2020. We estimated the increase in the population of potentially infected people (δE_i) for each
148 city based on the ratio of the number of infected persons (Q_i) to the total population of the city

149 (N). The timing of protests and the number of protesters in each city were collected from local
 150 news reports (Table 1). The increase in the population of potentially infected people (δE_t) and
 151 the populations of protesters (δS_t , regarded as an increase in the population of susceptible) were
 152 used as the force input for the model calculations to simulate the impact of protests on the
 153 outbreaks. When the protests begin, we force group E and group S to increase δE_t and δS_t ,
 154 respectively.



155
 156 **Figure 2: The impact of protests on the possible second outbreak in Minneapolis.** The blue
 157 dots denote the reported daily incidence of COVID-19 cases. The blue line represents the
 158 simulation and projections without protests, while the dashed red line denotes the simulation
 159 and projections with protests. Four scenarios with protests and four scenarios without protests
 160 are simulated. (a)~ (b), (c)~(d), (e)~(f), (g)~(h) are the simulation for Scenario 1, 2, 3, 4,

161 respectively. (a)~(b) and (c)~(d) are the simulations with seasonal forcing; (e)~(f) and (g)~(h)
162 are the simulations without seasonal forcing. (a)~(b) and (e)~(f) are the simulations where the
163 restrictions are completely lifted; (c)~(d) and (g)~(h) are the simulations where the restrictions
164 are partially lifted.

165 Figure 2 shows the projections for Minneapolis in 8 scenarios (4 scenarios with protests
166 and 4 without). After the COVID-19 restrictions were lifted, an upward trend of daily new
167 cases has been observed. The protests would significantly amplify the intensity of the second
168 outbreak but may not be able to advance it. In scenarios 1, the second outbreak of Minneapolis
169 will peak in mid-August 2020. The comparison between scenarios indicates that the effect of
170 intervention measures outweighs the seasonal forcing. For the rest of the 12 cities, the model
171 also predicted enhanced second outbreaks when the impact of protests is considered (Table 1).
172 Due to space constraints, the details of the projection results are not presented in the manuscript
173 and can be accessed at <http://covid-19.lzu.edu.cn/>.


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175 **Table 1 Projections of the second outbreaks in some US cities in Scenario 1**

Countries	Population (million)	Start date of Protests	Estimated participants	The peak time of the second outbreaks	Peak time daily new incidence without protests	Peak time daily new incidence with protests	End of the second outbreak	Accumulated Confirmed Cases
New York City (New York)	8.33	May, 29 th	25,000	Mid-August	Around 8,000	Around 18,000	End of 2020	Around 900,000
Chicago (Illinois)	5.15	May, 28 th	30,000	Mid-September	Around 2700	Around 4100	End of 2020	Around 390,000
Minneapolis (Minnesota)	1.26	May, 26 th	30,000	Mid-September	Around 400	Around 700	End of 2020	Around 48,000
Columbus (Ohio)	1.31	May, 28 th	10,000	Late-September	Around 120	Around 380	End of 2020	Around 35,000
Westchester (Illinois)	0.97	May, 29 th	30,000	Mid-August	Around 3,500	Around 5,500	September, 2020	Around 150,000
Philadelphia (Pennsylvania)	10.04	May, 30 th	10,000	Mid-October	Around 800	Around 1,700	End of 2020	Around 120,000
Seattle (Washington)	2.25	May, 29 th	50,000	Late-August	Around 2,00	Around 600	End of 2020	Around 35,000
Washington, D.C.	0.70	May, 29 th	10,000	Mid-October	Around 180	Around 650	September, 2020	Around 70,000
San Francisco (California)	0.88	May, 30 th	30,000	Mid-August	Around 100	Around 400	October, 2020	Around 22,000
Detroit (Michigan)	1.75	May, 29 th	30,000	Early-September	Around 1,000	Around 2,200	October, 2020	Around 70,000
Miami-Dade (Florida)	2.72	May, 30 th	20,000	Mid-August	Around 1,800	Around 3,000	September, 2020	Around 120,000
San Diego (California)	3.34	May, 29 th	30,000	Late-August	Around 1,000	Around 1,600	September, 2020	Around 130,000

177 **4 Projections of countries with reported protests**

United Kingdom



178
179 **Figure 3: The impact of protests on the possible second outbreak in the United Kingdom.**
180 The blue dots denote the reported daily incidence of COVID-19 cases. The blue line represents
181 the simulation and projections without protests, while the dashed red line denotes the
182 simulation and projections with protests. The scenarios in these subplots are the same as Figure
183 2.


184 In addition to the United States, protests of a certain scale also broke out in other countries.
185 Using similar parameterization of the protests, Table 3 presents the projections of the second
186 outbreaks in the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Italy, Australia, Canada, Spain,
187 Mexico, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland, and Denmark. For the United Kingdom
188 (Figure 3), the second outbreak is likely to peak during August. Under the impact of protests,

189 when the restrictions are lifted completely, a second wave with a peak of 14,160 is expected,
190 which is 75.6% higher than the scenario without protests (Scenario 1). The protests and the
191 lifting of restrictions, along with the enhancement in the ability of virus transmission in the
192 cold seasons due to temperature change may cause the recurrence of an outbreak that was
193 initially under control. If the same intervention measures are implemented during the second
194 outbreak, the second outbreak would be brought under control again by the end of 2020.

Table 2 Projections of the second outbreaks in some countries (with protests)

Countries	Population (million)	Start date of Protests	Estimated participants	The peak time of the second outbreaks	Peak time daily new incidence without protests	Peak time daily new incidence with protests	End of the second outbreak	Accumulated Confirmed Cases with protests
United Kingdom	66.48	May, 28 th	70,000	Early-August	Around 8,000	Around 14,170	End of 2020	Around 1,150,000
United States	328.2	May, 26 th	1,500,000	Late-July	Around 40,000	Around 120,000	End of 2020	Around 16,000,000
Germany	82.93	May 30 th	160,000	Early-September	Around 4,500	Around 7,000	End of 2020	Around 450,000
Italy	60.43	June, 30 th	150,000	Early-October	Around 6,000	Around 95,000	End of 2020	Around 600,000
Australia	25.44	June, 2 nd	14,000	Early-August	Around 500	Around 1,900	End of 2020	Around 45,000
Canada	37.05	May, 30 th	100,000	Late-September	Around 1,800	Around 2,500	End of 2020	Around 250,000
Spain	46.73	June, 1 st	10,000	Early-September	Around 7,600	Around 9,400	End of 2020	Around 1,100,000
Mexico	126.2	May, 30 th	50,000	Late-August	Around 5,800	Around 7,600	End of 2021	Around 1,500,000
Switzerland	8.57	May, 31 st	20,000	Early-August	Around 1,400	Around 2,100	October, 2020	Around 80,000
Belgium	11.42	June, 1 st	50,000	Late-August	Around 2,000	Around 4,200	End of 2020	Around 230,000
Netherlands	17.26	June, 1 st	56,000	Late-July	Around 1,800	Around 2,800	End of 2020	Around 170,000
Ireland	4.81	May, 31 st	20,000	Mid-July	Around 600	Around 1,500	End of 2020	Around 90,000
Denmark	5.73	May 31 st	20,000	Late-August	Around 600	Around 1,000	End of 2020	Around 60,000

197 **5 Projections of countries without reported protest**



198

199 **Figure 4: Projections of the second outbreak in India in different scenarios.** Scenarios 1
200 and 2 are simulated with seasonal forcing, while scenarios 3 and 4 are simulated without
201 seasonal forcing. Scenarios 1 and 3 are the projections where restrictions are fully lifted, while
202 scenarios 2 and 4 are the projections where restrictions are partially lifted.

203 Mass gathering events during the epidemic should be restricted or even banned since they
204 have the potential to enhance the second outbreak and pose further radical public-health
205 challenges for health authorities and governments^{23,24}. Lifting the restrictions too early may
206 also have the potential to trigger subsequent outbreaks and further increase the pressure on the
207 medical system. Fig 4 shows the projections of India in the four scenarios. With seasonal
208 forcing, it is predicted that the first peak of the epidemic will occur in September while the
209 second peak with higher intensity, caused environmental changes, will arrive in January 2021.
210 Without seasonal forcing, there would be only one peak in September 2020. We also projected
211 the epidemic curve for other countries including Russia, Brazil, Chile, etc. that are still in the
212 rapid growing period. We classified them as ‘non-protesting countries’, not because there are
213 no protests. Indeed, there might have been many protests and mass gatherings in India, Brazil,
214 and other regions that may impact the outbreak on varying degrees, but the information on the
215 timing and size of these protests are currently not available. Therefore, the role of these protests
216 on the timing and size of the outbreaks can not be isolated and may not be incorporated as a
217 force into the model.

218 From Table 3 we can see that the peak time and size of the second outbreak varies from
219 countries to countries, due to different levels of interventions measures, environmental

220 conditions, medical resources, etc. Regions with high population density are at higher risk of
221 enhanced second outbreaks. When control measures are lifted too soon and environmental
222 temperatures are more suitable for the spread of disease²⁵, an enhanced second outbreak is
223 expected. Therefore, when considering the timing of lifting the restrictions to restore the
224 economy, it is necessary to analyze epidemic situations as well as climate factors. For example,
225 during cold seasons when the transmission rate is higher, reopening would easily light up the
226 second outbreaks, since conducive environmental factors and related human social behaviors
227 (more frequent indoor gatherings) would, directly and indirectly, increase the transmission
228 ability of the virus, leaving more people vulnerable to infection. Therefore, the peak of the
229 second wave of the outbreak is most likely to synchronize with the fall of environmental
230 temperature, displaying strong seasonality. During winter months, the temperate regions of the
231 Northern and Southern Hemispheres experience highly synchronized annual influenza
232 epidemics²⁶. Additionally, when restrictions are lifted, personal protection (wearing face masks,
233 keeping appropriate interpersonal distance, sterilization, etc)²⁷. is still required or even
234 mandatory in indoor places so as to minimize the infection rate by cutting off the infection
235 routine.

Table 3 Projections of the second outbreaks in some countries in Scenario 1 (without reported protests)

Countries	Population (million)	The peak time of the second outbreaks	Peak time daily new incidence without protests	End of the second outbreak	Accumulated Confirmed Cases
India	1324	Early-November, 2020	Around 41,000	February, 2021	Around 6,000,000
Russia	144.5	Late-September, 2020	Around 12,000	April, 2021	Around 2,800,000
Brazil	209.5	Early-October, 2020	Around 60,000	February, 2021	Around 11,200,000
Peru	32.05	Late-October, 2020	Around 13,000	May, 2021	Around 2,500,000
Chile	18.60	Late-July, 2020	Around 11,000	April, 2021	Around 1,500,000
Argentina	44.49	January, 2021	Around 5000	April, 2021	Around 600,000
Pakistan	212.2	Early-August, 2020	Around 30,000	November, 2020	Around 2,700,000
Saudi Arabia	32.55	Late-July, 2020	Around 13,000	May, 2021	Around 3,500,000
Bangladesh	161.4	Late-August, 2020	Around 15,000	January, 2021	Around 1,600,000
Qatar	2.64	Early-September, 2020	Around 2,400	December, 2020	Around 240,000
Colombia	49.64	February, 2021	Around 12,500	May, 2021	Around 55,000
Belarus	9.51	Mid-August, 2020	Around 2,800	May, 2021	Around 2,800,000
Egypt	102.27	Mid-November, 2020	Around 2,800	March, 2021	Around 420,000
Ecuador	17.08	Mid-August, 2020	Around 5,000	December, 2020	Around 300,000

238 **6 Discussion and conclusion**

239 New treatments and vaccines are not yet available for any COVID-19-affected areas²⁸. With
240 the presence asymptomatic of carriers that may spread the virus, and the lack of herd immunity,
241 a second outbreak is inevitable as confirmed cases of COVID-19 increase. Our results show
242 that the timing and intensity of the second outbreaks are seasonally modulated and depend
243 largely on local reopening policies. Higher seasonal variations in COVID-19 transmission may
244 lead to a greater incidence of recurrent wintertime outbreaks²⁹. The current mass protests in the
245 United States and other regions of the world could lead to amplified second outbreaks,
246 overlapping the wintertime outbreaks and threatening more lives. This is because the extremely
247 crowded environments facilitate the spread of the virus, leading to high rates of the second
248 attack, as seen in both the 1918 pandemic and the 1957 Asian influenza pandemic³⁰⁻³².

249 If the transmission capacity of the second outbreak increases, it could place a catastrophic
250 burden on the health system and create even more serious social and economic crises. However,
251 if the chain of transmission is cut during the first outbreak, there will be no further outbreak
252 similar to the first wave. The necessary drug therapies and vaccines currently require long-term
253 development and testing, so nonpharmaceutical interventions are the only direct means
254 available to suppress the spread of the disease³³. In the face of a powerful pandemic, everyone
255 must help to fight the virus. We must collectively follow the distancing limits recommended
256 by global public-health organizations to effectively reduce the potential cost in the lives of the
257 second wave of infection. Our findings should encourage close monitoring and early warning
258 of the development of a global pandemic, as well as safeguards for our global prediction system
259 to best contain the second wave³⁴. These results provide a powerful scientific basis for
260 governments to adjust their policies and control measures in real-time, to achieve the most
261 effective allocation of medical resources before the second outbreak and to reduce the
262 associated health risks.

263

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270

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